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Abstract 
We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing 
evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of 
disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are 
more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an 
external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual 
funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ 
dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively 
related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. 
The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate 
information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be 
needed to realize greater benefit. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study we investigate the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price 
informativeness based on a large sample of Chinese listed firms. Roll (1988) suggest that the 
proportion of variations in stock price which is not explained by market-wide information 
captures firm-specific information available to investors in the stock market. Morck et al. (2000) 
document that China has one of the lowest stock price informativeness among the 40 countries in 
their analyses. They attribute this to weak investor protection institutional environment in China. 
Gul et al. (2010) and Hou et al. (2012) provide evidence that stock price informativeness in 
China is especially low among listed firms under state control. They attribute this to inefficient 
corporate governance among firms that are supported by the state. Low stock price 
informativeness implies weak corporate information environment, which reduces the ability of 
outside investors in the capital market to forecast firm performance and formulate valuation 
decisions. This in turn reduces investors’ confidence and the ability of the capital market to 
efficiently allocate financial resources to fund firms with growth opportunities. As China strives 
to become one of the largest economies in the world, the function of the stock market in 
supplying capital to firms will become increasingly important. Thus, the improvement of 
corporate information environment is an important issue to China’s further development and has 
implications to other emerging economies. 
Our focus on the effect of mutual fund ownership in improving corporate information 
environment in China is motivated by two strands of literature. First, previous studies highlight 
the important role of mutual funds in mitigating the agency problem and promoting better 
governance (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Smith, 1996; Tirole, 
2001). For example, Chou et al. (2011) show that mutual fund ownership is positively associated 
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with quality governance because they intentionally invest in well-governed firms and they 
remain active in monitoring firms they invest. Ng et al. (2009) use past firm performance as an 
indicator of managerial effectiveness and report that mutual fund exhibits weaker support for 
management proposal in under-performing firms. They conclude that the finding is consistent 
with mutual fund playing a monitoring role, as mutual funds attach importance to firm’s prior 
performance when casting proxy votes. Second, previous studies also highlight the association 
between corporate governance and corporate information environment. Information asymmetry 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control can be prominent because managers have 
the incentive to withhold information in order to benefit themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Existing studies indicate that improvements in internal or external 
governance mechanisms can constrain manager’s self-serving behavior and pressure managers to 
disclose high quality information, which can, in turn, lead to improved corporate information 
environment (Armstrong et al., 2012; Beasley, 1996; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Hou et 
al., 2012; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Klein, 2002). Based on the aforementioned literature, we 
expect mutual fund ownership to strengthen the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms and 
exert positive influence on the stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms. This is the 
first research question we seek to examine empirically. 
In 2000, Chinese government made a strategic decision to spur the development of mutual 
fund industry, as mutual funds were expected to play a central role in enhancing corporate 
governance in listed companies and balancing the rampant speculation by individual investors 
(CSRC, 2000). The mutual fund industry in China witnessed rapid growth in the first decade of 
the 21
st
 century. The number of fund management companies (mutual fund) has increased from 6 
(5) in 1998 to 57 (323) in 2006, and the total net asset under management increased from RMB 
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469 billion in 2005 to RMB 1796.9 billion in 2007 (Firth et al., 2010; Yuan et al., 2008).
1
 
However, whether the development of mutual funds improved the governance of Chinese listed 
firm remains an open question, as prior studies provide mixed evidences. For example, Yuan et 
al. (2008) report a positive association between mutual fund ownership and firm performance. In 
contrast, Firth et al. (2010) focus on the Split Share Structure Reform and find that mutual fund 
ownership is negatively related to the compensation given to tradable shareholders, indicating 
that mutual fund may not necessarily protect the interest of minority shareholders.
2
 We expect 
the external governance role of mutual funds in China to be moderated by state ownership of 
listed firms. This is because state support reduces the dependence of Chinese listed firms on 
capital market for external funding, which in turn reduces the ability of mutual funds to influence 
and pressure firms. In other words, we expect the positive relationship between mutual fund 
ownership and stock price informativeness to be less pronounced among firms with higher state 
ownership. This is the second research question we seek to examine through empirical analyses.  
To test our two aforementioned research questions, we construct stock price 
informativeness measures following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) for all the firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period between 2003 and 2008. We conduct a 
multivariate regression analysis incorporating mutual fund ownership, firm characteristics and 
fundamental corporate governance variables. Consistent with our expectation, we show that 
mutual fund ownership (as a ratio to either total shares or freely-traded shares) has a positive 
                                                             
1
Similarly, the considerable growth in the mutual funds industry was also observed in many markets such the US, 
Greece, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland  (Klapper et al., 2004). 
2
We suggest that the findings of Firth et al. (2010) should be interpreted with caution, because during the “split 
share structure reform” CSRC (the Chinese counterpart of SEC) transferred the voting rights from individual fund 
managers to the investment decision committee of the fund management companies, against which CSRC may 
impose strong political pressure to refrain funds from bargaining a more favorable compensation plan. The inference 
of Firth et al. (2010) might not be generalized to other settings where fund managers are less likely to suffer from 
external pressure that interferes with their investment decisions. 
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effect on stock price informativeness in China. Furthermore, we find the positive impact of 
mutual fund ownership on price informtiveness is less pronounced for state-controlled firms, 
consistent with the contention that a high concentration of state ownership may reduce the 
reliance of firms on outside investors for capital and reduce the influence of mutual funds. Our 
results are robust to different estimation methods (either with or without median regression) and 
alternative measure of stock price informativeness. 
This study contributes to existing academic literature in the following ways. First, our 
results suggest that, even under weak investor protection institutional environment, mutual fund 
ownership can serve as an external corporate governance mechanism that exerts positive impact 
on corporate information environment. Second, we highlight the offsetting role played by mutual 
fund and state ownership in shaping the corporate information environment in an emerging 
economy such as China. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual fund 
ownership should be further promoted in order to reduce the disadvantage of individual investors 
in terms of expertise and influence. However, to further realize the benefit of mutual fund 
ownership in improving corporate governance, it is necessary to promote further privatization of 
firms. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the hypotheses development; 
Section 3 discusses the methodology adopted in the empirical investigation, the sample selected 
and the summary statistics of the variables; and finally, our empirical findings are presented in 
Sections 4. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Literature and hypotheses  
2.1 Mutual funds and corporate governance 
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To date, existing studies have increasingly focused on the role of institutional investors in 
monitoring or influencing corporate managers. This can result from the fact that they are more 
willing to exert pressure on managers to make decisions in favor of boosting shareholders’ 
wealth, while simultaneously increasing the percentage of their shareholding in firms. Due to the 
highly concentrated holdings of institutional investors, their monitoring can be more cost 
effective. Therefore, in the extant studies, there is a consensus that agency problems pertaining to 
corporate governance can be mitigated by the involvement of institutional investors in the 
ownership of a firm, since proxy voting has been considered as one of the most cost-effective 
channels for monitoring activities. In some studies, aggregate institutional holdings was 
employed as a proxy for corporate monitoring strength (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gordon and 
Pound, 1993; Morgan and Poulsen, 2001). Cornett et al. (2007) provide evidence that both an 
increase in the number of institutional stockholders and their increased ownership percentage can 
improve firms’ operating performance. 
More specifically, the rationale for the role of institutional investors or mutual funds as 
corporate monitors is that, compared with individual investors, mutual funds or institutional 
investors present a dramatically larger incentive to monitor managers. This would prompt 
managers to be more concerned about firms’ performance and shareholders, and thus discourage 
them from opportunism (Cornett et al., 2007; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Mayer, 1997; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986).  In particular, among institutional or block stakeholders, Pound (1988) 
indicates that mutual funds can plan an direct role in corporate monitoring because of their 
investment expertise in addition to their large shareholding. 
Voting is recognized as the most direct and cost-effective channel through which mutual 
funds can pressure corporate managers into taking account of shareholders’ interests in 
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investment decisions. Using the SEC’s 2003 mandatory voting disclosure requirement as a 
governance mechanism for revealing mutual funds’ governance activities, a plethora of studies 
have attempted to shed light on the effect of mutual funds or their voting decisions on corporate 
governance. Morgan et al. (2011) find that voting given by mutual funds’ investors is indeed 
more supportive of shareholder-initiated proposals. This provides a potential opportunity for 
increasing shareholders’ wealth, especially when portfolio firms manifest weaker corporate 
governance.
3
 Based on data of 100 largest mutual fund families proxy voting records in the US 
between 2003 and 2006, Duan and Jiao (2011) find that mutual funds are more likely to vote 
against management when management recommendations on proposals conflict with those of 
independent proxy advisory firm (Institute Shareholder Services), which is consistent with 
mutual fund playing an active role in monitoring manager’s behavior. 
The evidence provided by Davis and Kim (2007) suggest that voting decisions have an 
impact on the quality of corporate governance in their targeted firms. In particular, the quality of 
corporate governance of a firm can be further strengthened by mutual fund investment, since 
their supportive voting can act as an essential determinant of a proposal’s passage, as well as of 
the board implementing such proposals (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas and Cotter, 2007). Using 
the Morningstar stewardship grade and individual governance component grade, Chou et al. 
(2011) suggest that mutual funds with better quality governance practices are more likely to 
exercise their shareholder rights and their voting and investment decisions in favour of their fund 
investors. More importantly, they show that those portfolio firms invested by mutual funds with 
higher quality governance tend to exhibit correspondingly higher corporate governance standards. 
                                                             
3
The voting behaviour of mutual funds can vary due to different types of proposal sponsors or voting issues. For 
details, please see Rothberg and Lilien (2006), Davis and Kim (2007) and Cremers and Romano (2011). 
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This results not only from the tendency to invest in firms with healthier governance, but also the 
fact that they are more effective corporate monitors.
4
 
 
2.2 Corporate governance and firm transparency 
A growing number of empirical studies have examined and evidenced that corporate 
governance practices, such as board structure, ownership structure, and changes in market-wide 
corporate policy or regulations, are important determining factors for the corporate information 
environment. By investigating the relationship between earnings manipulation and the internal 
governance structure, Dechow et al. (1996) show that firms with CEO duality, fewer outside 
block holders, or boards of directors dominated by management are more likely to attempt to 
manipulate earnings. This is in support of Beasley’s (1996) findings regarding the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial statement fraud. Greater independence of the board 
or audit committee can reduce abnormal accruals, and this effect is more prominent if there is a 
minority of outside directors on the board or audit committee (Klein, 2002).  A similar inference 
is also drawn by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) for Greek companies. Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
indicate that management earnings forecasts issued by firms with a higher proportion of outside 
directors or institutional ownership tend to be more reliable. Evidence in support of the positive 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate transparency is also 
provided by Kelton and Yang (2008), who adopted Internet financial reporting as the 
infomativeness measure. 
Corporate policy or regulation may also have an impact on corporate transparency, as 
Stefanescu (2011) claims that the level of corporate informativeness is determined by corporate 
                                                             
4
However, mutual funds’ voting decisions can be affected by their characteristics and free-rider or liquidity 
constraints (Bhide, 1993; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2010; Morgan et al., 2011; Pozen, 2002). 
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governance requirements under the Common Law regime. For instance, Armstrong et al. (2012) 
show that the passage of state anti-takeover laws in the US market can simultaneously improve 
information asymmetry, private information gathering and financial statement informativeness. 
The unique Split Share Structure Reform in the Chinese stock market is found to effectively 
increase share price informativeness through the increase in the proportion of freely tradable 
shares, and this improvement is more pronounced for firms with greater state control (Hou et al., 
2012).  
More supportive findings are documented for the Chinese market. Due to the dominant 
entrenchment effect, Ding et al. (2007) show that Chinese state-owned firms manifest a higher 
level of earnings management and consequently weakened minority shareholder protection. 
Moreover, they find that ownership concentration displays an inverted U shape relationship with 
earnings management. By examining the association between stock returns and earnings in the 
Chinese market, Firth et al. (2007) indicate that firms with a higher proportion of foreign 
shareholders and tradable shares tend to have higher levels of earnings informativeness, while 
the reverse effect can be found for those with a highly concentrated ownership. Greater 
ownership concentration can weaken corporate transparency for Chinese listed firms, while both 
auditor quality and foreign ownership show a positive association with corporate transparency 
(Gul et al., 2010). 
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
Based on the discussion in previous sections, we suggest that mutual fund ownership can 
have a positive impact on stock price informativeness through the following channels. First, high 
mutual fund ownership may play an active role in strengthening corporate governance and 
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disciplining managers to disclose high quality information, which results in improved corporate 
information environment. Better information environment helps to mitigate information 
asymmetry and reduce the monitoring cost against agency problems. Empirically, Velury and 
Jenkins (2006) find that the quality of reported earnings is positively associated with institutional 
ownership. Similarly, Chung et al. (2002), Koh (2003), and Hadani et al. (2011) indicate that the 
large ownership of institutional shareholder can provide effective monitoring and limit 
managerial expropriation over earnings management. Second, because mutual funds in general 
have significantly higher ownership than individual investors, fund managers have more 
incentive and reduced cost to collect firm-specific information (e.g., direct communication with 
the management), and these information can be subsequently impounded into stock price through 
trading. For instance, Jiambalvo et al. (2002) provide the evidence that institutional investors can 
have more information (or even more timely information) and thus can react more quickly than 
non-sophisticated investors. Maffett (2012) report that more privately informed trading by 
mutual funds is found in the stocks with lower corporate transparency. Examining the 
informativeness of trading in the Taiwan stock market, Chiao et al. (2010) show that the 
informativeness of mutual funds’ net trades is better than that of securities dealers. Similarly, 
Jiang et al. (2011) demonstrate that higher ownership of institutional investors can narrower 
firms’ bid-ask spread and increase market quality index. Based on these arguments, we 
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis H1: Mutual fund ownership increases stock price informativeness among 
Chinese listed firms. 
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          However, this improvement in the firm’s information environment could be mitigated by 
the dominant state ownership in Chinese listed firms. There are two possible reasons for this. 
First, firms with higher state ownership receive greater financial support from government, 
which in turn reduces their dependence on stock market for external capital (e.g. Chen et al. 
(2011)). Among firms with less reliance on stock market for financing, the ability of mutual fund 
to influence and discipline managers against opportunistic behavior is reduced. Second, the 
significant concentration of state shareholders leads to an entrenchment effect, since both 
controlling shareholders and managers with a substantial amount of ownership have greater 
incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 
2002; Johnson et al., 2000; Mcconnell and Servaes, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stulz, 
1988). Concentrated state ownership can result in information being withheld, less protection for 
minority shareholders, as well as lower corporate performance and a reduction in firms’ value, 
because these shareholders are more interested in pursuing their own political ambitions and 
prospects rather than looking after the interests of other shareholders or maximizing the value of 
the firm. Existing evidence suggest that there is limited relationship between share prices and 
executive pay in state-owned firms (Firth et al., 2006; Wei and Xiao, 2006). Based on the 
discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H2: The positive impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price 
informativeness among Chinese listed firms is moderated by state ownership. 
 
3. Methodology and sample  
3.1 Measure of stock informativeness 
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Our principal measure of price informativeness is proposed by Roll (1988). Theoretically 
speaking, the stock price of a firm is less likely to convey firm-specific information and thus less 
informative if the stock returns of a firm is strongly correlated with market return.
5
 We estimate 
stock price informativeness using firm-specific regressions of weekly excess returns on market 
excess returns as follows. As previous research (i.e. Ding and Cheng, 2011) suggests that US 
market leads the movement of Chinese market, in equation (1) we account for the systematic 
stock return of the US market. In equation (2) we only consider the systematic stock return of the 
Chinese stock market. 
                                       (1) 
                                                          (2) 
where RETit is the weekly excess return of individual stocks in China; CNMKETRETt is the weekly 
excess return of the Shanghai Composite Index; USMKETRETt is the weekly excess return of the US 
stock markets, which is calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). We use the 7-day China 
interbank offered rate as a proxy for the risk free return in China and we use the one-month Treasury 
bill rate as the risk free return in the US. Following Fernandes and Fereira’s (2008), we use a logistic 
transformation of     
  as follows: 
         
    
 
  
                (3) 
where     
  is the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility for firm i and is obtained from 
the firm-specific weekly return regression. We denote the stock price informativeness measure as 
  and    respectively for the    calculated based on the   
  of Equations (1) and (2). Using the 
market model, we can decompose total stock return variations into two components. One is the stock 
                                                             
5 Roll (1988) shows that the measure captures private information because it has little correlation with public news. 
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return variation relates to the market wide factors, and the other is associated with firm specific 
factors. As a consequence, we define the share price informativeness measures as the fraction of 
firm-specific return variation to the market-wide variation. Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) indicate 
that some firms may be more sensitive to market-wide or economy-wide shocks and thus both firm-
specific and market wide return variations are scaled by the total stock return variation. Therefore, we 
have   
  and     
  in Equation (3). 
 
3.2. Test of hypothesis 
To test our hypotheses H1 and H2, we use the measure of share price informativeness 
developed in section 3.1 as the dependent variable and regress it on the variable of fund-holding 
percentage and a set of control variables. Following prior studies such as Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008) and Cornett et al. (2007), we use the lead–lag approach to test how the fund ownership 
level at year t affects the stock informativeness at year t+1 as follows: 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 31
k
i t i t i t i t i t k kk
Fund SOR Fund SOR Control                                 (4) 
where Ψi,t+1 is a measure of share price informativeness derived from time-series regressions of 
firm-specific weekly excess returns on stock market weekly excess returns for firm i in year t (i.e. 
it is calculated using weekly excess return from January to December each year, and thus yearly 
informativeness proxy is constructed). We use    and    specified in Section 3.1 above as 
dependent variables for the main tests and additional tests respectively. We define Fund as the 
ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares. SOR is defined as the ratio of state 
shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for 
state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. 
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We first introduce a set of control variables including firm characteristics. These variables 
have been shown in the literature to have an impact on the level of firm transparency. SIZE 
captures firm size and is defined as the natural log of market capitalization. PB captures growth 
and is measured as market-to-book value. LEV captures leverage and is measured as the debt-to-
total asset ratio. IROA captures profitability and is the industry median adjusted return on assets, 
measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as 
turnover. ST is a dummy variable indicating loss firms and is equal to 1 if firms experience two 
consecutive years of loss at year t and t-1 (and therefore labeled as “Special Treatment” by the 
stock exchange) and 0 otherwise.
6
 SSSR is a dummy variable indicating Split Share Structure 
Reform and is equal to 1 if the firm has completed the reform compensation negotiation process 
and 0 otherwise. FOR foreign ownership defined as the ratio of foreign shares relative to total 
shares.  
We also include a number of corporate governance variables to test the 
marginal/incremental impact of mutual funds on corporate transparency. To capture the impact 
of the quality of external auditing, Big4 is auditor quality indicator and is equal to 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG) and 0 
otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index of the 
ownership from the 10 largest shareholders.  DCEOH is CEO stock ownership and is set to 1 if 
the ratio of shares held by the CEO is below 25% or above 75% of the cross-sectional annual 
observation, which may induce entrenchment. Duality is 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves 
as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is board activeness and equal to 1 if the 
meeting frequency of the firm is equal to or above the median value of cross-sectional annual 
                                                             
6The rationale of setting this dummy variable is to capture the delisting risks because listed firms which experience 
3-year consecutive loss will be delisted by the regulatory commission (see Liu and Lu (2007)). 
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observation, and 0 otherwise. Dbsize is equal to 1 if the number of board members is equal to or 
above the median value of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. Dind is board 
independence and is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the 
median value of cross-sectional annual observation, and 0 otherwise. Dssize is equal to 1 if the 
number of the supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional 
annual observation, and 0 otherwise. These independent variables are given at fiscal year-end 
report. 
          In Equation (4), the relationship between mutual fund ownership and share price 
informativeness can be evaluated by α1, which is the coefficient on Fund. Based on Hypothesis 
H1, we can expect α1 to have a significantly positive value if the share-holding of mutual funds 
can improve the quality of corporate governance in their portfolio firms, and if share price 
informativeness can be improved by higher quality corporate governance. According to 
Hypothesis 2, we expect a significant and negative coefficient α3 on the interaction term 
Fund×SOR, which indicates the incremental relationship between the level of share price 
informativeness and the interaction between mutual fund ownership and the sensitivity of the 
abolition of restricted shares. In other words, a negative α3 implies that a higher proportion of 
state shares in a firm will moderate the positive relationship between mutual fund and share price 
informativeness. 
 To enhance the rigor and robustness of our evidence, we also implement different sets of 
additional tests using alternative measures of state ownership, mutual fund ownership, and stock 
price informativeness. We substitute SOR with the alternative variable RSR, which is measured 
as number of restricted shares to total shares, and SOE, which is equal to 1 for state-controlled 
firms and 0 otherwise. We substitute Fund with the alternative variable Fundt measured as the 
15 
 
ratio of fund ownership to the number of total shares. We substitute    with     specified in 
Section 3.1 above as dependent variable. Finally, we also further classify mutual funds into 
closed end and open end funds to determine whether these two groups differ in effect. 
 
3.3 Data and sample statistics  
The data used in our study are mainly taken from CSMAR (China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research) and CCER (China Centre for Economic Research). The sample covers a 
period from 2003 to 2008. Variables on state ownership status, special treatment, industry, and 
Split Share Structure Reform variables such as SOE, ST, SSSR, and industry classification are 
from CCER. All other variables are constructed using CSMAR. In order to construct the 
informativeness measures, the Chinese market returns are taken from DataStream and the US 
stock market returns are from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices).  
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the share price informativeness measures used as 
the dependent variable in the multivariate regression, the main explanatory variables for testing 
the proposed two hypotheses, as well as the control variables over the sample period from 2003 
to 2008. In total, we obtain 6,104 firm-year observations. The two informativeness measures, ψ1 
and ψ2, have similar means and medians. We expect to observe a lower average for ψ1 than ψ2 
as the former has taken into account the impact of the US market while the latter has only 
accounted for the domestic Chinese market information. These imply that the incorporation of 
the US market returns does not explain a large proportion of the return variation in the Chinese 
market. Also, the value of the means is close to and slightly larger than their medians, indicating 
that the distribution is nearly symmetrical. The mean of Fund, the fund ownership to freely 
traded shares ratio, is 0.069 with a standard deviation of 0.139. However, its’ median level is 
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0.001 and the third quartile is 0.057.  These figures confirm the intuition that fund ownership 
tends to be large when fund managers decide to include the firm in their investment portfolios.  
The median level of SOR is 0.348, with a standard deviation of 0.245. This shows that there 
is a small deviation in the state ownership across firms in the Chinese market. These figures 
differ slightly from the observations of Gul et al. (2010) due to the differences in the sample 
period covered.  The average of SOE is 0.699 and this indicates that state-owned enterprises 
constitute the majority of the Chinese listed firms.  Among the control variables, due to the rapid 
growth of the Chinese economy and Chinese stock market investment activities, the median 
levels of trading volume and market to book ratios are higher than those observed in earlier 
studies, at 3.923 and 2.457 respectively.  The first quartile and third quartile of the leverage ratio 
in Chinese firms are 0.374 and 0.629 respectively. The proportion of foreign shares compared to 
total shares is low with an average level of 0.067, and Table 1 also shows a very small number of 
Chinese firms using the big 4 auditing companies, equivalent to 7.06%. Finally, it is of interest 
that the average level of CEO duality is only 1%.   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
From Table 2, it can be seen that the correlation coefficient between the two informativeness 
measures is up to 0.8976. This confirms the interpretation from Table 1 that a very small 
proportion of Chinese stock return innovation is contributed by the US market information and 
provides the explanation that results are robust when these two measures are adopted 
alternatively. We also observe a negative relationship between the two share price 
informativeness measures and state ownership, restricted share percentage and the state-
controlled enterprises dummy variable. This is consistent with firms under state control having 
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lower corporate disclosure incentives since they are less dependent on capital market for funding.  
In general, most of the correlations reported in Table 2 are below 0.2 and thus present no 
concerns about multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Main tests of hypotheses 
Table 3 reports our main test of hypotheses H1 and H2. In Table 3, Regressions 1, 3, and 5 (2, 
4, and 6) are estimated without (with) using the bootstrapped median regression approach, which 
can be applied to control for the influence of outliers. Controls of region, industry, and year 
effects are applied consistently across these regressions. In Regressions 1 and 2, we analyze the 
relationship between stock price informativeness and fund ownership, and apply size as the firm 
characteristics control variable. The coefficient on Fund is significantly positive in both cases. 
This indicates a significantly positive relationship between the level of mutual fund ownership 
and the stock price informativeness measures, which is consistent with our predictions in 
hypothesis H1. In other words, we have empirical evidence that firms with higher institutional 
ownership lead to higher transparency, and this is probably due to the external corporate 
governance role of such investors. In Regressions 3 and 4, we interact mutual fund ownership 
with state ownership ratio, and again apply size as the firm characteristics control variable. The 
coefficient on Fund is significantly positive, which indicates that mutual fund ownership is 
positively related to stock price informativeness among low state ownership firms. This is 
evidence that the transparency of firms with greater dependence on stock market for funding is 
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more influenced by mutual fund ownership. The coefficient pertaining to Fund×SOR is 
significantly negative, which indicates that the positive relationship between mutual fund 
ownership and stock price informativeness is moderated in the presence of state ownership. In 
other words, we have evidence consistent with our hypothesis H2. In Regressions 1 to 4, we 
apply size as the only firm characteristics control variable to demonstrate that findings consistent 
with our hypotheses are not affected by potential multicollinearity issue among the control 
variables we apply later on in the rest of our empirical analyses. In Regressions 5 and 6, we 
strengthen the rigor of our inference by incorporating all firm characteristics and corporate 
governance control variables. The coefficient on Fund is significantly positive while the 
coefficient on the interaction term Fund×SOR is significantly negative. This suggests our 
previous findings are not driven by confounding effects associated with growth, leverage, 
profitability, liquidity, distress, institutional reform, foreign ownership, ownership concentration, 
auditor quality, as well as corporate governance mechanisms captured by various CEO and board 
characteristics.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
This positive coefficient on Fund in our regression analyses in Table 3 is different from the 
results in the correlation matrix of Table 2, which shows a negative relationship between fund 
ownership and share price informativeness measures. This may result from the fact that bivariate 
correlation analysis cannot control possible confounding factors which we control in multivariate 
regression analyses. However, our results in Table 3 are consistent even when we include one 
control variable only. We also test the sum of the coefficients SOR and the interaction term 
(Fund×SOR) for Regressions 3 and 5 in Table 3, and we obtain the coefficient as –0.523 (t-stat = 
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–1.86) and –0.7017 (t-stat = –2.48), which further shows that the state ownership has significant 
negative impact on the stock informativeness. Turning to the control variables, Table 3 suggest 
that stock price informativeness is lower among larger, more profitable, and higher trading 
volume firms, which is probably due to greater influence of such firms to the movement of 
market portfolio returns. Firms that are more levered also have lower stock price informativeness 
possibly because such firms have greater dependence on debt capital and therefore have less 
incentive to communicate with equity investors. Firms with larger supervisor board have higher 
price informativeness, and this implies that internal governance plays a role in corporate 
transparency.  Finally, in the untabulated robustness checks, we also adjust for firm clustering 
effect in our analyses and obtain results with consistent inference to our main findings. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
 In Tables 4 to 7, we present analyses where we apply alternative state ownership, fund 
ownership, and stock price informativeness measures. The overall purpose is to ensure that our 
main findings are not specific to the way we compute these measures in Table 3. In Table 4 we 
substitute state ownership ratio (SOR) by restricted share ratio (RSR) to capture state influence. 
Under the split share structure, state owners are required to hold restricted shares. After the Split 
Share Structure Reform which is announced in 2005, firms go through a gradual process of 
reduction in restricted shares. In our sample latter sample period, i.e. 2006 to 2008, restricted 
shares are still in existence across many firms. Firms with higher restricted shares have more 
shareholders that cannot trade their shares and therefore less interested in stock return 
performance of their firms, which in turn may reduce firm incentives to communicate with 
outside investors. Throughout Table 4, the coefficient on Fund is significantly positive while the 
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coefficient on the interaction term FundRSR is significantly negative. This implies that mutual 
fund ownership improves transparency of firms that have less restricted shareholders. Since 
restricted shares are mainly held by state shareholders as confirmed by the significantly positive 
correlation between SOR and RSR in Table 2, this is also consistent with our main results. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Table 5 we substitute state ownership ratio (SOR) with state-owned enterprise dummy 
variable (SOE). This alternative measure captures whether state shareholders are the controlling 
shareholder. Controlling shareholder have more influence on firm decision making and firms 
dominated by state shareholders are expected to be less dependent on capital market, which 
reduces incentives to communicate with outside investors. In Table 5 we also scale the fund 
ownership measure by total number of shares (Fundt) instead. The fund ownership measure we 
applied in Table 3 is scaled by the number of freely tradable shares. The alternative measure we 
use incorporates restricted shares mainly held by state shareholders. In other words, the 
differences between these two measures are likely to be greater in firms with higher restricted 
shares. Across Table 5, the coefficient pertaining to Fundt is significantly positive while that of 
the interaction term FundSOE is significantly negative. This suggests that firms with higher 
institutional investor ownership relative to total share ownership improves transparency of firms 
that have are not controlled by state shareholders. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Table 6 substitutes the dependent variable with alternative stock price informativeness 
measure estimated only using Chinese stock market portfolio returns. The objective is to evaluate 
if our main findings in Table 3 is sensitive to the exclusion of US stock market portfolio returns 
from our estimation of stock price informativeness. In this set of analyses, we apply mutual fund 
ownership scaled by the number of freely tradable shares (Fund) and state controlled listed firm 
dummy variable (SOE). In both Regressions 1 and 2, we observe that the coefficient on Fund is 
significantly positive and the coefficient on FundSOE is also significantly negative, which is 
similar to our main findings. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
  Table 7 partitions fund ownership into open and close ended fund separately. If the 
underlying assumption that institutional investors influence corporate transparency holds, then 
we should observe this effect in both groups of funds. Indeed, the coefficient on OCFund is 
significantly positive and the coefficient on OCFundSOE is also significantly negative, 
irrespective of whether the OCFund is based on open or close ended fund ownership. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
We predict and find evidence that mutual fund ownership increases stock price 
informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying mechanism of this influence is as 
follows. Institutional investors have more expertise and incentives to monitor firm than 
individual investors. As such, institutional investors can serve an external corporate governance 
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role to reduce agency problem that arise from the separation of ownership and control. When 
managers have less incentive to expropriate shareholders or behave opportunistically, firms are 
less likely to withhold information and/or window dress their performance. As a result, the 
quality and quantity of firm-specific information released to outside investors are expected to 
improve as corporate governance improves. As a result, investors are able to formulate valuation 
decisions based on firm-specific instead of market-wide information. In other words, the stock 
return variations of firms are less likely to be attributed to systematic market-wide variations. 
Thus, this is reflected in the greater stock price informativeness that we measure. 
We also predict and find that state ownership moderates the positive influence of mutual fund 
ownership on stock price informativeness in China. We argue that the underlying rationale of 
this effect is as follows. Firms with higher state ownership in China receive government financial 
support. Such firms have less dependence on stock market for external capital to fund their 
investment projects. When firms are less reliant on stock market for funding, there is less need 
for them to communicate with investors in order to reduce information uncertainty and decrease 
cost of equity capital. Among firms with greater state ownership and control, the ability of 
institutional investors to monitor and influence is also likely to reduce since managers in such 
firms answer more to the state than to the stock market. 
The main policy implication from our study is that institutional investors should be further 
encouraged in weak investor protection environments that are common in emerging economies 
such as China. However, at the same time, in order to further realize the benefit of institutional 
investors as external governance mechanism, it is necessarily to expand the process of 
privatization.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Std. Median 25% 75% Obs. 
1  2.0387 1.1474 1.7680 1.2182 2.5784 6104 
2  2.5021 1.5853 2.0908 1.4593 3.0206 6104 
Fund 0.0695 0.1394 0.0012 0.0000 0.0574 6104 
Fundt 0.0293 0.0633 0.0004 0.0000 0.0225 6104 
SOR 0.3224 0.2488 0.3478 0.0262 0.5385 6104 
RSR 0.5422 0.1471 0.5661 0.4479 0.6482 6104 
SOE 0.6997 0.4584 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 6104 
Size 20.4658 1.0508 20.4197 19.8190 21.0683 6104 
PB 3.6599 3.7652 2.4568 1.6628 4.2272 6104 
LEV 0.4992 0.1813 0.5118 0.3743 0.6290 6104 
IROA 0.0000 0.0629 0.0007 -0.0151 0.0262 6104 
VOL 5.2516 3.9116 3.9225 2.2301 7.3312 6104 
ST 0.0668 0.2498 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6104 
SSSR 0.4274 0.4947 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 6104 
FOR 0.0665 0.2492 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6104 
OwnCon 0.2025 0.1334 0.1670 0.0988 0.2848 6104 
Big4 0.0706 0.2562 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6104 
DCEOH 0.2543 0.4355 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 6104 
Duality 0.0100 0.0995 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6104 
Dmeet 0.5680 0.4954 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 6104 
Dbsize 0.3625 0.4808 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 6104 
DInd 0.8721 0.3341 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6104 
Dssize 0.9078 0.2894 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 6104 
Note: This table presents the summary statistics. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2003-
2008. Ψ1 (Ψ2) is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series 
regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US (Chinese) stock market 
weekly excess returns. Fund (Fundt) denotes the ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-
traded shares (total shares). SOR (RSR) is with the ratio of state shares (restricted shares) relative to 
the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is equal to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset 
ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by 
total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience 
two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR 
is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme 
has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. 
Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young 
or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders.  
DCEOH  is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of 
the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson 
of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or 
equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of 
directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is 
equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional 
annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or 
above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
27 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1  1 
          
2 2  0.8976* 1 
         3 Fund -0.0385* -0.0571* 1 
        4 Fundt -0.0157 -0.0396* 0.9025* 1 
       5 SOR -0.0637* -0.0566* 0.0550* -0.0277 1 
      6 RSR -0.0597* -0.0217 0.004 -0.1674* 0.3762* 1 
     7 SOE -0.0304* -0.0353* 0.0551* 0.0371* 0.6642* 0.0448* 1 
    8 lnsize -0.1699* -0.1788* 0.3791* 0.3004* 0.2593* -0.0392* 0.2609* 1 
   9 PB -0.1201* -0.0897* 0.1554* 0.1492* -0.0791* -0.0269 -0.0871* -0.2818* 1 
  10 Lev 0.0198 0.0528* -0.0978* -0.0722* -0.0879* -0.0616* -0.0634* -0.1961* -0.0152 1 
 11 IROA -0.0936* -0.1268* 0.3292* 0.2885* 0.0915* 0.0533* 0.0524* 0.3617* 0.0565* -0.4628* 1 
12 Vol -0.1495* -0.1265* -0.0583* -0.0414* -0.1230* -0.2410* -0.0878* -0.0436* 0.2040* 0.0162 -0.0504* 
13 ST 0.0364* 0.0623* -0.1520* -0.1394* -0.0994* 0.01 -0.1147* -0.3450* 0.1744* 0.4381* -0.2426* 
14 SSSR -0.0503* -0.1062* 0.1829* 0.2321* -0.1891* -0.4217* -0.0845* 0.1140* 0.1583* -0.0685* 0.1166* 
15 FOR -0.0106 -0.0079 0.0444* 0.0178 -0.1281* 0.0868* -0.0887* 0.0596* -0.0031 -0.0557* 0.0305* 
16 OwnCon -0.0154 -0.0241 0.1088* -0.0238 0.5815* 0.5635* 0.2686* 0.2845* -0.0585* -0.1277* 0.1588* 
17 Big4 -0.0417* -0.0467* 0.1726* 0.0586* 0.0918* 0.0432* 0.0880* 0.3436* -0.0211 -0.0562* 0.0878* 
18 DCEOH -0.0034 -0.0032 0.0716* 0.0994* -0.1051* -0.0886* -0.0314* 0.0797* -0.0447* -0.0836* 0.0821* 
19 Duality 0.003 0.0074 -0.011 -0.0047 -0.0385* -0.0253 -0.0446* -0.0017 0.0057 0.0129 -0.0179 
20 Dmeet 0.0195 0.0189 -0.0186 -0.0247 0.0616* 0.0450* 0.0572* -0.0055 -0.0352* -0.0813* 0.0139 
21 Dbsize -0.0474* -0.0399* 0.0388* 0.0027 0.1178* 0.1233* 0.1220* 0.1142* -0.0400* -0.0202 -0.0128 
22 DInd -0.0094 -0.0051 0.0411* 0.0550* -0.0970* -0.0704* -0.0807* 0.0239 0.0171 -0.0037 0.0665* 
23 Dssize 0.0094 0.0106 0.0036 0.0073 0.1114* -0.0364* 0.1284* 0.0701* -0.0217 -0.0037 0.004 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix (continued) 
    12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
12 Vol 1 
           
13 ST -0.0402* 1 
          
14 SSSR 0.5597* -0.0950* 1 
         
15 FOR 0.0154 -0.0188 0.0333* 1 
        
16 OwnCon -0.1554* -0.1029* -0.1847* -0.0513* 1 
       
17 Big4 -0.0568* -0.0695* -0.004 0.0645* 0.1476* 1 
      
18 DCEOH -0.0304* -0.1277* 0.0345* -0.0153 -0.1216* -0.0157 1 
     
19 Duality -0.0005 0.0264 0.0015 0.0295* -0.0440* 0.0067 0.0111 1 
    
20 Dmeet -0.0158 -0.0440* -0.0421* 0.0155 0.0379* -0.0450* 0.0534* -0.0189 1 
   
21 Dbsize -0.0886* -0.0624* -0.0933* 0.0452* 0.0368* 0.0690* -0.0124 -0.0072 0.0447* 1 
  
22 DInd 0.1294* -0.0415* 0.1562* 0.0271 -0.0413* 0.0061 0.0144 0.014 -0.0297* -0.1665* 1 
 
23 Dssize -0.0827* -0.0540* -0.1097* -0.0312* 0.0445* 0.028 0.0303* 0.0049 -0.0214 -0.0032 -0.0209 1 
Note: This table presents the correlation matrix. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2003-2008. Ψ1 (Ψ2) is share price informativeness measure 
derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US (Chinese) stock market weekly 
excess returns. Fund (Fundt) denotes the ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares (total shares). SOR (RSR) is with the ratio of state shares 
(restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SOE is equal to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. SIZE is natural log of market 
capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income 
divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially 
treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has 
been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit 
firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders.  DCEOH is set to be 1 if 
shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as 
chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual 
observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if 
the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board 
members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
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Table 3. The impact of fund ownership and state ownership ratio on share price informativeness 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
Fund 0.161 (1.920) 
* 0.123 (1.650) * 0.390 (2.810) *** 0.481 (2.940) *** 0.508 (3.500) *** 0.648 (4.680) *** 
SOR     
        0.129 (2.360) ** 0.155 (2.620) *** 0.047 (0.710)  0.083 (1.360)  
Fund SOR     
        -0.652 (-2.160) ** -0.928 (-2.710) *** -0.768 (-2.560) ** -1.013 (-4.440) *** 
lnsize -0.150 (-12.650) *** -0.137 (-11.430) *** -0.154 (-12.570) *** -0.144 (-14.260) 
*** -0.137 (-8.950) *** -0.127 (-8.830) *** 
PB     
                    0.002 (0.400)  -0.003 (-0.730)  
Lev     
                    -0.224 (-3.220) *** -0.129 (-2.150) ** 
IROA     
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
-1.357 (-5.760) *** -1.362 (-7.650) *** 
Vol     
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
-0.019 (-3.970) *** -0.010 (-2.420) ** 
ST     
                    0.126 (2.320) ** 0.190 (5.140) *** 
SSSR     
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
-0.040 (-0.700)  -0.048 (-0.810)  
FOR     
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
-0.039 (-0.930)  0.018 (0.390)  
OwnCon     
  
    
  
    
  
    
  
0.224 (1.920) * 0.194 (2.430) ** 
Big4     
                    0.028 (0.610)  0.047 (0.710)  
DCEOH     
                    -0.036 (-1.430)  -0.042 (-2.130) ** 
Duality     
                    0.000 (0.000)  0.102 (0.900)  
Dmeet     
                    -0.012 (-0.520)  -0.005 (-0.240)  
Dbsize     
                    0.031 (1.320)  -0.001 (-0.050)  
DInd     
                    -0.037 (-1.040)  -0.035 (-1.450)  
Dssize     
                    0.074 (2.080) ** 0.074 (1.860) * 
Constant 5.398 (21.100) 
*** 4.292 (17.030) *** 5.441 (21.010) *** 4.396 (20.440) *** 5.134 (13.560) *** 4.792 (10.770) *** 
Region   Yes 
    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Industry   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
BSQREG   No     Yes     No     Yes     No     Yes   
Adj R2   0.465           0.466           0.4739         
Pseudo R2         0.294           0.295           0.302   
Obs.    6104     6104     6104     6104     6104     6104   
 
Note: This table presents the results of the following regression model: 
   
k
k kktitititit
ControlSORFundSORFund
1 3,,3,2,101,1
  
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The dependent variable Ψ1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on 
both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. Fund denotes the ratio of fund ownership relative to the number of freely-traded shares. SOR denotes the ratio 
of state ownership relative to total number of shares of the firm. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. 
IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the 
firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share 
Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the 
firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest 
shareholders.  DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for 
firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of 
cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is 
equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board 
members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
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Table 4. Alternative state ownership measure based on restricted share ratio 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Fund 0.742 (2.590) 
*** 0.537 (2.140) ** 0.721 (2.450) ** 0.761 (2.820) *** 
RSR 0.233 (2.620) 
*** 
0.165 (1.950) 
* 0.124 (1.130)  0.100 (1.100) 
 
Fund×RSR -1.106 (-2.170) 
** -0.772 (-1.790) * -0.900 (-1.750) * -0.861 (-1.800) * 
lnsize -0.148 (-12.480) 
*** -0.137 (-16.090) *** -0.136 (-8.830) *** -0.127 (-9.540) *** 
PB     
        0.001 (0.280)  -0.005 (-1.030)  
Lev     
        -0.222 (-3.180) *** -0.133 (-1.780) * 
IROA     
        -1.352 (-5.730) *** -1.381 (-6.100) *** 
Vol     
        -0.019 (-3.930) *** -0.008 (-1.540)  
ST     
        0.125 (2.290) ** 0.191 (4.670) *** 
SSSR     
        -0.032 (-0.550)  -0.043 (-0.700)  
FOR     
        -0.041 (-0.960)  0.001 (0.030)  
OwnCon     
        0.188 (1.580)  0.217 (2.470) ** 
Big4     
        0.027 (0.580)  0.051 (0.990)  
DCEOH     
        -0.032 (-1.260)  -0.034 (-1.340)  
Duality     
        0.002 (0.020)  0.091 (0.940)  
Dmeet     
        -0.012 (-0.520)  -0.006 (-0.260)  
Dbsize     
        0.028 (1.210)  -0.002 (-0.100)  
DInd     
        -0.038 (-1.070)  -0.038 (-1.060)  
Dssize     
        0.073 (2.050) ** 0.073 (3.080) *** 
Constant 5.224 (19.850) 
*** 4.180 (19.530) *** 4.283 (10.470) *** 4.711 (13.490) *** 
Region   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Industry   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
BSQREG   No     Yes     No     Yes   
Adj R
2
   0.466           0.474         
Pseudo R
2
         0.294           0.302   
Obs.    6104     6104     6104     6104   
Note: This table presents the results of the following regression model: 
   
k
k kktitititit
ControlRSRFundRSRFund
1 3,,3,2,101,1
  
The dependent variable Ψ1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions 
of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. RSR denotes the ratio of 
restricted shares relative to total shares of the firm. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. 
LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by 
total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss 
(therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share 
Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares 
relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or 
KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders.  DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares 
held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for 
firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the 
firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the 
board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent 
directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory 
board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 
2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Table 5. Alternative mutual fund ownership measure scaled by total shares 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 
Fundt 1.210 (3.300) *** 0.898 (3.230) *** 
SOE 0.074 (2.640) *** 0.059 (2.740) *** 
Fundt×SOE -0.973 (-2.440) ** -1.204 (-2.170) ** 
lnsize -0.139 (-9.210) *** -0.127 (-7.250) *** 
PB 0.002 (0.530)  -0.002 (-0.440)  
Lev -0.222 (-3.190) *** -0.123 (-1.650) * 
IROA -1.330 (-5.650) *** -1.307 (-4.690) *** 
Vol -0.019 (-3.950) *** -0.010 (-2.030) ** 
ST 0.127 (2.340) ** 0.181 (5.610) *** 
SSSR -0.029 (-0.700)  0.012 (0.220)  
FOR -0.035 (-0.610)  -0.042 (-0.630)  
OwnCon 0.199 (2.060) ** 0.229 (2.700) *** 
Big4 0.035 (0.760)  0.046 (0.810)  
DCEOH -0.036 (-1.440)  -0.039 (-1.460)  
Duality 0.013 (0.140)  0.097 (0.980)  
Dmeet -0.015 (-0.670)  -0.010 (-0.550)  
Dbsize 0.026 (1.120)  -0.006 (-0.290)  
DInd -0.033 (-0.940)  -0.022 (-0.610)  
Dssize 0.070 (1.970) ** 0.069 (2.160) ** 
Constant 4.344 (11.040) *** 3.964 (8.200) *** 
Region   Yes     Yes   
Industry   Yes     Yes   
Year   Yes     Yes   
BSQREG   No     Yes   
Adj R2   0.474         
Pseudo R2         0.302   
Obs.    6104     6104   
Note: This table presents the results of the following regression model: 
   
k
k kktititititi
ControlSOEFundtSOEFundt
1 3,,3,2,101,
  
The dependent variable Ψ1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series 
regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. SOE is 
equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and 0 otherwise.  Fundt is the ratio of fund ownership relative to the 
total number of shares. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset 
ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading 
volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated 
by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the 
consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. 
Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is 
the Herfindahl index of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders. DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO 
holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO 
also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above 
or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is 
equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors 
is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board 
members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Table 6. Alternative share price informativeness measure excluding US market influence 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 
Fund 0.430 (2.130) ** 0.719 (3.580) 
*** 
SOE 0.074 (0.820)  0.110 (1.560) 
 
Fund×SOE -0.733 (-1.700) * -1.171 (-3.180) 
*** 
lnsize -0.193 (-8.740) *** -0.179 (-9.620) 
*** 
PB 0.004 (0.670)  -0.001 (-0.230) 
 
Lev -0.217 (-2.140) ** -0.024 (-0.450) 
 
IROA -2.146 (-5.910) *** -1.800 (-5.990) 
*** 
Vol -0.022 (-3.270) *** -0.004 (-1.010) 
 
ST 0.204 (2.720) *** 0.279 (4.420) 
*** 
SSSR -0.109 (-1.250)  -0.112 (-1.530) 
 
FOR -0.028 (-0.450)  -0.013 (-0.210) 
 
OwnCon 0.122 (0.780)  0.163 (1.320) 
 
Big4 0.046 (0.720)  0.061 (1.000) 
 
DCEOH -0.032 (-0.900)  -0.033 (-1.340) 
 
Duality 0.015 (0.120)  0.215 (1.590) 
 
Dmeet -0.002 (-0.080)  -0.009 (-0.330) 
 
Dbsize 0.057 (1.710) * 0.023 (1.130) 
 
DInd -0.013 (-0.260)  0.000 (0.000) 
 
Dssize 0.068 (1.350)  0.065 (1.480) 
 
Constant 5.986 (10.980) *** 5.555 (12.040) 
*** 
Region   Yes     Yes   
Industry   Yes     Yes   
Year   Yes     Yes   
BSQREG   No     Yes   
Adj R
2
   0.449         
Pseudo R
2
         0.279   
Obs.    6104     6104   
Note: This table presents the results of the following regression model: 
   
k
k kktitititit
ControlSOEFundSOEFund
1 3,,3,2,101,2
  
The dependent variable 
2  denotes share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series 
regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese market weekly excess returns. Fund denotes the ratio of fund 
ownership relative to the number of freely-traded shares. SOE is equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and 0 
otherwise. SIZE is natural log of market capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is 
industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as 
turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 
0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been 
voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index of the ownership from 
the 10 largest shareholders.  DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% of the 
cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Dmeet is equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
Dbsize is set to 1 if the number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. 
Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual 
observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
.  
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Table 7. Open and close-end fund ownership 
  
OCFund = Open Fund Ownership Ratio OCFund = Close-end fund Ownership Ratio 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
OCFund 0.505 (2.880) 
*** 0.773 (4.950) *** 1.801 (3.680) *** 1.672 (3.210) *** 
SOE 0.033 (0.490) 
 0.075 (1.270)  0.048 (0.750)  0.060 (0.940)  
OCFund×SOE -0.774 (-2.080) 
** -1.274 (-4.190) *** -2.803 (-2.920) *** -2.270 (-3.180) *** 
lnsize -0.135 (-8.830) 
*** -0.126 (-10.890) *** -0.136 (-9.090) *** -0.122 (-8.590) *** 
PB 0.002 (0.550) 
 
-0.003 (-0.640) 
 
0.002 (0.520) 
 
-0.003 (-0.670) 
 
Lev -0.222 (-3.180) 
*** -0.125 (-1.580)  -0.218 (-3.150) *** -0.120 (-1.570)  
IROA -1.320 (-5.640) 
*** -1.332 (-7.080) *** -1.356 (-5.780) *** -1.389 (-5.300) *** 
Vol -0.019 (-3.970) 
*** -0.009 (-2.680) *** -0.021 (-4.630) *** -0.013 (-3.790) *** 
ST 0.123 (2.260) 
** 0.187 (3.330) *** 0.121 (2.230) ** 0.186 (4.010) *** 
SSSR -0.036 (-0.630) 
 -0.038 (-0.700)  -0.039 (-0.680)  -0.061 (-0.940)  
FOR -0.035 (-0.850) 
 
0.019 (0.560) 
 
-0.043 (-1.030) 
 
0.005 (0.140) 
 
OwnCon 0.225 (1.930) 
* 0.206 (2.280) ** 0.225 (1.940) * 0.190 (2.130) ** 
Big4 0.030 (0.650) 
 0.055 (0.820)  0.030 (0.640)  0.026 (0.430)  
DCEOH -0.034 (-1.350) 
 -0.040 (-1.880) * -0.037 (-1.460)  -0.041 (-1.740) * 
Duality 0.000 (0.000) 
 0.104 (0.790)  0.003 (0.030)  0.085 (1.180)  
Dmeet -0.012 (-0.530) 
 -0.006 (-0.240)  -0.012 (-0.540)  -0.006 (-0.290)  
Dbsize 0.031 (1.310) 
 
0.000 (-0.030) 
 
0.031 (1.330) 
 
-0.003 (-0.140) 
 
DInd -0.036 (-1.020) 
 -0.036 (-1.160)  -0.038 (-1.090)  -0.039 (-1.000)  
Dssize 0.073 (2.040) 
** 0.068 (2.770) *** 0.076 (2.160) ** 0.080 (2.860) *** 
Constant 5.086 (13.460) 
*** 4.767 (18.200) *** 5.123 (13.810
) 
*** 4.684 (13.370
) 
*** 
Region   Yes     Yes 
    Yes     Yes   
Industry   Yes     Yes 
    Yes     Yes   
Year   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
BSQREG   No     Yes     No     Yes   
Adj R
2
   0.474            0.473         
Pseudo R
2
         0.302            0.301   
Obs.    6104     6104     6104     6104   
Note: This table presents the results of the following regression model: 
   
k
k kktititititi
ControlSOEOCFundtSOEOCFund
1 3,,3,2,101,
  
The dependent variable Ψ1 is share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific 
weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess returns. SOE is equal to 1 if the firm is a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) and 0 otherwise.  OCFundt is represents the ratio of open fund ownership relative to the total number of shares in Regression I and II, and 
represents the ratio of close-end fund ownership relative to the total number of shares in Regression III and IV. SIZE is natural log of market 
capitalization. PB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as 
operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. ST is equal to 1 if the firms experience two-year 
consecutive loss (therefore specially treated by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. SSSR is equal to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share 
Structure Reform i.e. the consideration scheme has been voted through and 0 otherwise. FOR is the ratio of foreign shares relative to total shares. 
Big4 is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young or KPMG). OwnCon is the Herfindahl index 
of the ownership from the 10 largest shareholders.  DCEOH is set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above the 75% 
of the cross-sectional annual observation. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. Dmeet is 
equal to 1 if the meeting frequency of the firm is above or equal to the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dbsize is set to 1 if the 
number of directors on the board is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dind is equal to 1 if the ratio of 
independent directors is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. Dssize is set to 1 if the number of supervisory board 
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members is equal to or above the median of cross-sectional annual observation. The sample period covers 2003 to 2008. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Appendix. Definition of Variables 
 
1,1  t  
 
Share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions 
of firm-specific weekly excess returns on both Chinese and US stock market weekly excess 
returns for firm i in year t (i.e. it is calculated using weekly excess return from January 
to December each year, and thus yearly informativeness proxy is constructed). 
1,2  t  Share price informativeness measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions 
of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese stock market weekly excess returns. 
Fund (Fundt) Ratio of fund ownership to the number of freely-traded shares (total shares) 
SOR Ratio of state shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm 
RSR Ratio of restricted shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm 
SOE Dummy variable set to 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise. 
 
Control Variables: 
Size The natural logarithm of market capitalization 
PB Price-to-book ratio  
Lev Debt-to-total asset ratio 
IROA Industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset 
Vol Trading volume measured as turnover 
ST Dummy variable indicating loss firms and is equal to 1 if firms experience two 
consecutive years of loss at year t and t-1 (and therefore labeled as “Special 
Treatment” by the stock exchange) and 0 otherwise. 
SSSR Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm has finished the Split Share Structure Reform requirement 
For Number of foreign shares relative to the total number of shares 
OwnCon The Herfindahl index of the top 10 largest blockholders of the firm 
Big4 
 
Dummy variable assigned to 1 if the audit firm is one of the big 4 (i.e. PwC, Deloittee, Ernst 
& Young, and KPMG); and 0 otherwise 
DCEOH Dummy variable set to be 1 if shares held by CEO holding ratio is below the 25% or above 
the 75% of the cross-sectional annual observation which may induce entrenchment 
Duality 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO  also holds the position of board chair; and 0 otherwise 
Dmeet 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is equal to or above the median 
value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
Dbsize 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board members is equal to or above the median 
value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
Drind 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is equal to or above the 
median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
Dssize 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is equal to or above 
the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
 
Industry and region dummies are definition: 
The industry dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry 
Classification Standard) codes.  
The region dummies are constructed by following Frith et al. (2006), in which the firms are grouped into 
four different regions by the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more 
developed areas including the open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; and 4. 
The least developed area in the north-western part of the country. 
 
